Shivshankar Menon

The West sees China's rise as a challenge to its hegemony. For the Chinese, this is merely the restoration of the natural order of things—of China as the world's largest economy and the center of the world. What makes the West particularly nervous is that China has shattered two important misconceptions: first, the expectation that as China modernized, it would become increasingly Western; second, the idea that single-party rule by the Communist Party of China would inevitably give way to demands for Western-style democracy. Many in the West thought that China would be integrated into the Western economic and political order, as Japan was after World War II. But that's not how the story has unfolded. Moving forward, we should expect continued assertion and pursuit of its interests by China—both in its neighborhood and on the world stage.

India and the United States have increasingly similar conceptions of Asian security: both want cooperation with China in building a network of relationships with the other significant powers in East and Southeast Asia, while neither wants China to emerge as the dominant regional power. While this strategic convergence will continue, India does not fit simply into U.S. Asia policy, given India’s policy of “strategic autonomy.” How can policymakers promote a closer U.S.-India relationship without triggering either Chinese concerns about containment or Indian concerns about entrapment?