Jonathan D. Pollack

China's estrangement from North Korea continues to fester and deepen. Following protracted negotiations in the aftermath of Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test and subsequent satellite launch, the U.N. Security Council has imposed far more severe restrictions on North Korean trade, finance, and maritime activities. The resolution—which passed on March 2 and for which China was a key drafter—portends a much edgier and uncertain relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang.

Early 2016 is an uneasy and potentially disquieting time in East Asia and in international politics as a whole. A pronounced slowing of economic growth across much of the globe (the United States is among the few exceptions); appreciably heightened geopolitical rivalry in locations of great importance to major as well as middle powers; the increased prevalence of nativism and forms of anti-foreign nationalism in numerous industrial democracies; acute upheaval and internal conflict across the Middle East and Southwest Asia, with attendant consequences for nearby regions (most notably a severe refugee crisis in Europe); and North Korea's fourth nuclear weapons test all suggest the erosion or outright breakdown of international order functioning since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization as a major economic force. The U.S. presidential election is an additional and very troubling manifestation of global uncertainty: numerous candidates openly advocate policies that would represent an abdication of America's global leadership role and a retreat into narrow nationalism.

To judge by media accounts from last weekend’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the United States and China are headed into very troubled waters. Beijing’s accelerated efforts to fortify reefs and shoals in the South China Sea and the U.S. Pacific Command’s surveillance of these activities—including press leaks that China has positioned two “motorized artillery pieces” on an unspecified location in the Spratly Islands—dominated news coverage. For many observers, this action-reaction cycle portends more worrisome possibilities.

In an interview with Radio Television Hong Kong, Jonathan Pollack discusses the Chinese president's recent visit to South Korea, examining stronger relations between China and South Korea and U.S. reactions, China's adjusted attitude toward its traditional ally North Korea and South Korea-Japan relations.

Yesterday's brutal, abrupt execution of the second ranking ruler of North Korea, Jang Song-thaek, culminated a stunning week in Pyongyang, perhaps the world's most isolated and repressive capital. For much of its history, North Korea has posed acute threats to the outside world. It is the most militarized regime on earth and in recent years has repeatedly threatened South Korea and persisted in the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while sustaining a highly repressive course toward its own citizens. However, the execution of Jang, by marriage a member of the ruling Kim dynasty, represents a very different threat to the system's viability. For decades, North Korea (though mired in economic dysfunction and international isolation) has sought to maintain a façade of unity within its ruling elites. On Sunday, North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong-un, presided over an enlarged session of the Party Politburo, where Jang was accused of a wide array of crimes, including the building of a "factional group" within the leadership and a variety of lesser sins. At the staged trial prior to his execution, Zhang was explicitly charged with plotting the overthrow of the Kim regime. Though Jang was not as close to Kim Jong-un over the past year, he seemed the indispensable fixer of the North Korean system, and among the handful of senior politicians who had meaningful international experience, most notably with China.

President Obama and China's new leader, Xi Jinping, convene this week in Rancho Mirage for their first face-to-face discussion as presidents. It is a summit without precedent in Sino-American relations. Both leaders agreed to informal discussions very different from the highly structured agendas generally associated with presidential meetings. Detached from the diplomatic protocol and elaborate preparations of most summits and physically far removed from both capitals, the two days of meetings have a very different objective. Little heed will be paid to the "deliverables" often used to measure success or failure in discussions between heads of state. By focusing first on understanding each other and the challenges both countries face, the two hope to achieve a comfort level that will enable larger achievements over the longer run.

China's ascendance as a major power and its implications for the world economy, global governance and international security continues to be a source of major debate. The scope and rapidity of China's ascent have placed China at the centre of deliberations over international strategy. There are few historical precedents for the spectacular pace of China's economic advance, and the growth of its comprehensive national power has generated considerable unease. At the same time, by the acknowledgment of its senior leadership, China's overall development remains 'unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.' The extreme concentration of economic and political power in the hands of state-owned enterprises, glaring income inequality and pervasive corruption, industrial overcapacity fuelled by local and provincial interests, widespread environmental degradation and an underdeveloped legal and institutional framework highlight the consequences of unregulated growth presided over by highly protected elites almost entirely removed from public scrutiny. To numerous observers, the lack of accountability and transparency and the inability or unwillingness of central leaders to address the inequities of Chinese development reveals a system in disarray.