Jeffrey A. Bader

China's President Xi Jinping will meet once again with President Obama at the end of March on the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. This will be President Obama's only bilateral meeting with any of the 52 heads of state and government attending the summit, so it will be a sign of respect for Xi and an indication of how important President Obama considers the U.S. relationship with China (the subject of a new paper of mine).

Serious people understand that the manner in which the United States deals with China will be a critical, if not the critical, overseas challenge for the United States in the 21st century. But how should we deal with China? What policy framework best optimizes U.S. interests, which are multiple and not always consistent with each other?

There are countries whose worldview and foreign policy are subject to dramatic swings reflecting the perspective of their changing leaders. Russia under Vladimir Putin is a prime example—he is personally a driving force behind much of his country's strategy and approach, at home and abroad.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China has gone through a series of phases marked by sharply differing conceptions of what its leaders believe the international order should look like. These changing views reflect an underlying ambivalence toward the existing order. China is currently undergoing a new phase, whose meaning can be understood more fully by understanding how China's leaders got to where they are today in their thinking about the global order. By examining the continuity and the changes of the last seven decades, what is genuinely new and different and what is familiar can be better distinguished.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting the United States next week for his first state visit at a time of considerable turmoil in the relationship. Frictions over numerous issues—in particular Chinese activities in the South China Sea, accusations over cyberespionage, and resurgent concerns over human rights in China—have brought the relationship to what some analysts see as a tipping point, between a relationship that is predominantly cooperative to one that is primarily overt rivalry. Key constituencies in the United States—notably the business community that has traditionally been a pillar of the U.S.-China relationship, as well as nongovernmental organizations, academics, and students of the relationship—can no longer be counted upon to stand up against the relationship’s critics.

East Asia has avoided major military conflicts since the 1970s. After the United States fought three wars in the preceding four decades originating in East Asia, with a quarter of a million lost American lives, this is no small achievement. It is owing to the maturity and good sense of most of the states of the region, their emphasis on economic growth over settling scores, and the American alliances and security presence that have deterred military action and provided comfort to most peoples and states. But above all else, it is due to the reconciliation of the Asia-Pacific’s major powers, the United States and China, initiated by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and nurtured by every American administration and Chinese leadership since.

East Asia has avoided major military conflicts since the 1970s. After the United States fought three wars in the preceding four decades originating in East Asia, with a quarter of a million lost American lives, this is no small achievement. It is owing to the maturity and good sense of most of the states of the region, their emphasis on economic growth over settling scores, and the American alliances and security presence that have deterred military action and provided comfort to most peoples and states. But above all else, it is due to the reconciliation of the Asia-Pacific’s major powers, the United States, and China, initiated by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and nurtured by every American administration and Chinese leadership since.