Evan A. Feigenbaum

a nonresident senior associate, The Carnegie Asia Program

Evan A. Feigenbaum is a nonresident senior associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Based in Chicago, he is also the vice chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent center, located at the University of Chicago, established by former Treasury secretary and Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson. Initially an academic with a PhD in Chinese politics, Feigenbaum’s career has spanned government service, think tanks, the private sector, and three major regions of Asia.

Articles by Evan A. Feigenbaum

In 2005, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick used the term "responsible stakeholder" to address how China should wield its influence in the coming future. In his remarks, he classified the U.S.-China relationship as one that must be built on not only shared interests but shared values. A decade later, how has China contributed positively to the international system and met U.S. expectations as a responsible stakeholder? Going forward, what challenges, changes, and concerns will shape China's developing role in global and regional affairs?

For 35 years, the central issue confronting China's leaders has been a primarily economic one: how to assure a continued run of rapid economic growth. Indeed, so important was China's quest for growth that it became, in effect, the leadership's default solution to a vast array of political and social challenges in the post-Mao era. Consider, for example, the challenge of forestalling revolt and maintaining political stability. Beijing's apparent strategy to assure public support for an unelected ruling party was to deliver rapid growth, raise living standards for millions of Chinese, and thus co-opt potential sources of discontent. Or take foreign policy, where Beijing leveraged growth and sheer market power tobuild ties in Asia and around the world.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Washington this week, the United States and India will have an opportunity to assess—and then bolster—their nascent cooperation in Asia. The fact is, this triangular relationship matters. It has often been argued that the United States and India don't "need" China as a rationale for cooperation. Two continental-sized countries, with deep maritime traditions and a diverse array of energy, economic, and security interests, have numerous reasons to cooperate and coordinate. But there can be no denying that China looms large in the strategic calculations of both countries.

It has long been presumed that economic integration can and will mitigate U.S.-China security competition. But to put it bluntly, this does not seem to be happening. So when President Xi Jinping visits Washington next month, it is essential that the U.S. and China use his visit to confront, not tiptoe around, the underlying reasons for this.

In November 2012, I found myself at the Trident Hotel in Mumbai—one of a tiny handful of Americans attending a forum, sponsored by prominent Indian and Chinese business organizations, on Asian financial integration. There is something a bit unsettling about being nearly the only American at a discussion of financial order held not on the Potomac, East, Hudson, or Thames, but near the banks of the Mithi River. And surely there is something deeply symbolic about a forlorn group of Americans listening to power brokers from China, India, Japan, and elsewhere discuss how to remake the financial order on a pan-Asian basis. After all, the United States has dominated global finance in the postwar era, which is a byproduct of the unique role of the U.S. dollar, the United States’ weight in global institutions, and the best-in-class status of so many U.S. financial services firms, among other factors.

It has long been presumed that economic integration can and will mitigate U.S.-China security competition. But to put it bluntly, this does not seem to be happening. So when President Xi Jinping visits Washington next month, it is essential that the U.S. and China use his visit to confront, not tiptoe around, the underlying reasons for this.