Dean Cheng

The U.S. government has reported that China has deployed several batteries of surface-to-air missiles (HQ-9) to Woody Island, Paracels, in the South China Sea. This is a significant military move, and it makes clear that China is prepared to employ military forces to support its expansive claims to the South China Sea. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has previously deployed some of its advanced fighters (J-11 fighters, the domestic version of the Su-27) to Woody island but did not apparently make this permanent. This surface-to-air missiles deployment appears to be for the longer term.

Fast on the heels of the COP21 climate change conference, the Obama administration announced its first, and likely last, arms sale to Taiwan in this term. Totaling some $1.83 billion, the sale will include two decommissioned frigates, Javelin and TOW-2B anti-tank missiles, Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, amphibious vehicles and various support equipment.

Since at least 2004, Chinese security thinking has undergone a steady shift toward emphasizing the maritime domain. As its economy has grown, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become increasingly dependent on the world's oceans to sustain its economy and people and to move its products to market. Indeed, to maintain and improve what it considers its "comprehensive national power" (zonghe guojia liliang), the PRC clearly needs access to the world's seas.

With the decision to conduct a Freedom of Navigation operation (FONOP) in the waters around China's artificial islands in the South China Sea, U.S.-Chinese relations appear set to deteriorate in the coming year. Given the likely rise in tensions, especially if the United States conducts additional FONOPS, it is essential that U.S. leaders understand the Chinese perspective, even as they must make clear to Beijing (and others) that they are firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the seas.

As Washington gears up for the visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, right on the heels of the Pontiff, there is a growing urgency for the United States to make clear to Beijing that its behavior is leading to increased tension at both the bilateral and regional level. But, there appears little appetite for such plain speaking; instead, the Obama Administration is projecting an aura of weakness, not resolve. Indeed, it is sobering to consider several incidents that have been revealed in just the past few weeks.

Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has demonstrated a willingness to use its increasing economic influence to pressure neighboring countries in physical geographic disputes and to strong-arm foreign companies wanting to enter the Chinese economy. These efforts are part of a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated strategy to protect China’s national interests through economic, diplomatic, political, and even cultural elements in addition to military means.

Beijing has been busy. China has begun to deploy advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to a contested island in the South China Sea. Missile launchers and a radar system are now installed on Woody Island in the Paracels, which were seized by China from South Vietnam in 1974 and remain a source of contention between the two nations. To underscore its commitment to retaining those islands, China sank three Vietnamese ships near the islands in 1988. The Paracels are separate from another island group, the Spratlys, where China has constructed a number of artificial islands. But both the missile installations and the island building are part of a larger, integrated Chinese effort to establish dominance over the South China Sea.

My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

In 2001, President George W. Bush’s Administration agreed to a major arms sale to Taiwan. Approved for sale to Taipei were anti-submarine warfare aircraft, anti-ship missiles, self-propelled howitzers, minesweepers, and destroyers. The United States also agreed to help Taiwan obtain new diesel-electric submarines, to modernize the island’s underwater forces. At the time, the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) had two ex-Dutch Zwaardvis-class boats, built in the 1980s, and two ex-U.S. Navy Guppy-class boats built at the end of World War II.

he U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have diametrically opposed interests on several critical issues, particularly outside the economic sphere. Taiwan’s defense, freedom of the seas, and American advocacy for universal liberal democratic values are just a few. There is no prospect that the two governments will come to an agreement on any of these political and security issues in the near or even medium term.

Hong Kong has long been a test case for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and also an indicator for Sino-American relations. The reversion of Hong Kong from British rule to Chinese control was seen as a demonstration of the viability of the “one country, two systems” approach. At base, Hong Kong is a test of whether the PRC can be sufficiently flexible to allow some pluralism. A successful transition would indicate that China was a pragmatic power that was likely to evolve and be able to incorporate alternative approaches, within a system that would remain dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beijing, and some in Washington, saw it as the potential way to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Developments in Hong Kong mean that “one country, two systems” is likely permanently off the table as a settlement approach for cross-strait relations. In fact, any kind of political reconciliation between the PRC and Taiwan has been set back for the foreseeable future. This, in turn, has obvious implications for the United States, given the commitment Washington has made to ensuring that the future of Taiwan is determined through peaceful means. Furthermore, because Hong Kong was already a wealthy community when it transitioned to Chinese control, the reversion would also be a test to see whether China was likely to become a society that would respond to increasing wealth with a concomitant demand for greater political freedom—and whether Beijing would be able to handle such demands. In this regard, given the status of Hong Kong as a major global financial center, China would have additional incentives to ensure the community’s stability and credibility.

U.S. president Barack Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping will meet this week, in a state visit by the American president to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the eve of the APEC Summit. Counting side discussions at multilateral conferences, this will be the fourth meeting between the two presidents—a remarkable, and even laudable, track record of top leaders interacting with each other.

Over the past several months, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has exploited more and more tools to reinforce its claims over much of the East Asian littoral. The intended Chinese message seems clear: Administratively, militarily, diplomatically, and economically, the East Asian littoral is under Chinese dominance. Ironically, even as the Chinese have been accelerating their efforts at dominating the East Asian littoral, the U.S. appears to be backing away. Despite the much-touted "pivot to Asia," the Obama Administration has spent far more time on trying to broker Arab–Israeli peace than looking to stabilize East Asia. That Beijing's concept of security-and, as important, whom it is providing security for-may not align with American hopes and interests appears lost.

The third plenum of Chinese Communist Party Congresses is often the time when the country's rulers introduce major policy shifts. The Eighteenth Party Congress in November and, crucially, implementation over time of policies announced there offers the U.S. an opportunity to reassess China, to see whether top leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are interested in pursuing reform or will hew to the course of their predecessors. This opportunity could be wasted if the persistent myths that have long plagued American views of China are not dispelled. The key myths feature overstating Chinese economic prowess and understating clashing security interests between the China and the U.S.

U.S. defense planners are now focusing on Syria, but they have also been compelled to plan for countering Chinese efforts at what Western analysts term "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capabilities. How successfully Washington deals with Beijing's increasing capabilities in this area will go a long way toward determining how much faith our western Pacific allies place in our commitments to them. China's efforts at developing A2/AD capabilities, which the Chinese term "counter-intervention," are rooted in the pattern of Chinese economic growth and their assessment of lessons learned from recent major wars. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mao Zedong, fearing attack from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, concentrated economic development well-inland. Mao sought to protect China's "third-line" of industry from attack by interposing China's physical space between it and likely attackers. Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, reversed much of this policy (among many others) when he inaugurated the period of Reform and Opening in 1978. Thanks to Deng's policies, China's economic center of gravity has shifted to its coast, where foreign and domestic investment has been most heavily weighted. Indeed, part of Bo Xilai's popular appeal (as Party Secretary of inland Sichuan province) was his argument that China's inland areas had been slighted for more than three decades of economic expansion.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sino–Russian relations have expanded and deepened, resulting in arms deals and increasing economic ties. Russia has the potential to become a major energy supplier to the growing Chinese economy, which is demanding ever-increasing amounts of energy. While both countries desire to constrain U.S. power and Western influence, they still view each other as regional competitors in Central Asia. If a close Sino–Russian strategic relationship develops, it could limit the capacity of the U.S. to act abroad and undermine economic freedom, democracy, and human rights in Greater Eurasia. As the Obama Administration focuses on the Middle East and Europe and the U.S. cuts its defense budget, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are striving to deepen their relationship. The leaders of the two major Eurasian powers have conducted a series of high-priority, high-level official reciprocal diplomatic visits. In the aftermath of the planned NATO forces withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),[1] a forum to discuss regional security and economic issues, is assuming a higher profile. Their military and economic relationship is expanding, and their rhetoric is often directed at countering American power. The Sino–Russian rapprochement coincides with the U.S. unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War, and has continued into the 21st century. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Beijing believe that American power represents a geopolitical challenge to them both. The prospect of formal or informal alliance that brings together the economic and political power of China and Russia would be a major problem for American interests, just as its Sino–Soviet predecessor was in the 1950s during the Cold War. For this reason, such an alliance has long worried American policymakers and analysts. Indeed, a long-standing concern throughout the Cold War was the prospect that the United States would need to confront China and the Soviet Union simultaneously.

Over the past year, China's leadership has indicated that it is intent upon pushing maritime development. In a recent study session involving the top Chinese leadership, Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of the sea for China's economic development and national security, and reiterated the need to make China a "strong maritime nation."[1] This appears to be part of his "China dream." Beijing's decision to build a navy is a natural outgrowth of China's dependence on the sea for resources and trade. But China is also party to disputes with virtually all of its maritime neighbors, including formal U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines, as well as Taiwan, which holds carefully constructed American security guarantees. And China's construction of an anti-access/area denial system directly challenges American interests in the region.

After a multi-year investigation, the computer security firm Mandiant announced this week that it had tracked a cyber group back to its Chinese roots.[1] Even more explosive, it had concluded that the group is, in fact, a Chinese military unit, the Second Bureau of the Third Department of the General Staff Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), with the Military Unit Cover Designator 61398.

Americans have been interested in China for a long time. In 1784, when the American War for Independence was barely over, the first ship to sail under an American flag left New York. It was the merchant ship Empress of China, bound for Canton (now Guangdong), China. At first, the American interest in China was economic. Americans were looking for new markets to buy goods, as the British refused to deal with Americans. And the Chinese preferred to work with Americans, who bought Chinese goods. The Europeans only wanted to sell them things. By the middle of the 19th century, though, the relationship had grown. American churches led the way, seeking converts to Christianity among China's enormous population. American missionaries began preaching in China in the 1830s, even when they could not legally visit many areas. Missionaries were among the first Americans to study the Chinese culture and language, and helped to shape American perceptions of Imperial China. For their part, many Chinese saw America as a land of opportunity, just like immigrants from Europe did. Many Chinese immigrated during the California Gold Rush, and more helped to build the Transcontinental Railroad. The United States signed a treaty to encourage Chinese immigration and guaranteed them protection from discrimination.

Americans have been interested in China for a long time. In 1784, when the American War for Independence was barely over, the first ship to sail under an American flag left New York. It was the merchant ship Empress of China, bound for Canton (now Guangdong), China. At first, the American interest in China was economic. Americans were looking for new markets to buy goods, as the British refused to deal with Americans. And the Chinese preferred to work with Americans, who bought Chinese goods. The Europeans only wanted to sell them things. By the middle of the 19th century, though, the relationship had grown. American churches led the way, seeking converts to Christianity among China's enormous population. American missionaries began preaching in China in the 1830s, even when they could not legally visit many areas. Missionaries were among the first Americans to study the Chinese culture and language, and helped to shape American perceptions of Imperial China. For their part, many Chinese saw America as a land of opportunity, just like immigrants from Europe did. Many Chinese immigrated during the California Gold Rush, and more helped to build the Transcontinental Railroad. The United States signed a treaty to encourage Chinese immigration and guaranteed them protection from discrimination. Some Chinese leaders were inspired by the American political system. Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, is said to have modeled his political philosophy of the "Three Principles of the People" after Abraham Lincoln's belief in government "of the people, by the people, for the people." When Sun helped to overthrow the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and to found the Republic of China, his principles became part of the new republic's constitution.

On December 27, the Chinese government released its third white paper on its space activities. The release of China's Space Activities in 2011[1] seems to establish a pattern of releasing white papers on space issues about every five years (previous ones were released in 2000 and 2006) and seems consistent with the finalization of national five-year plans (FYP).

Under the clear terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. is obligated to make available the hardware and services necessary for Taiwan's defense. This obligation is a critical component of U.S. policy in the Western Pacific, as it ensures that, in the event of a cross-Strait conflict, Taiwan will not be overwhelmed by a technologically superior People's Liberation Army. In order to meet this obligation, the U.S. should provide Taiwan with the equipment necessary to help it secure control of its own airspace. Failure to do so will only spark uncertainty about America's resolve to meet its global commitments, uncertainty that will only further embolden an already confident China.

In recent years, China has made great strides in its space program. Growing Chinese counterspace capabilities are beginning to threaten U.S. space superiority and therefore the ability of the U.S. to support its friends and allies and to deter aggression. To deal with the challenge, the U.S. should maintain and expand robust space capabilities, develop alternatives to space-based systems to reduce American vulnerability, and increase U.S. knowledge and understanding of Chinese space capabilities.

The expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in many ways a logical and even forgone conclusion. China is the world's second-largest economy; its heavy dependence on trade inevitably makes the seas of growing importance to national well-being. Yet as China's maritime ambitions continue to expand, the U.S. is faced with a challenging task: recognizing Chinese interests without acceding to Chinese demands. How America meets this challenge will determine the future of the Asia–Pacific region and whether America's maritime dominance will continue through the next century.