by Mark Beeson
As we shall suggest in the first part of this article, such developments come as no surprise to security specialists and International Relations scholars of a realist bent in both the United States and China.1 This is, after all, the very stuff of ‘high politics’ and the expected behaviour of Great Powers as they—inevitably, the argument goes—seek ascendancy in a never-ending struggle for power. But even if we accept such claims and the logic that underpins them, one of the most striking features of the relationship between the United States and China is how much is being played out in what might be described as the ‘ideational realm’. We have become accustomed to thinking of the United States as possessing some sort of ‘soft power’, even if there is heated debate about what this concept might mean and how it might operate.2 What is more unexpected, perhaps, is the idea that China might possess such qualities, too.3 But, as we explain, not only is this idea becoming commonplace, it is increasingly associated with the so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’ and/or a ‘Chinese model’ of development.